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Introduction
The relative size of the public sector differs greatly across countries, even among those at similar income levels. For instance, the US, Japan and the Scandinavian countries are very similar in terms of per capita income, but the share of government spending was some 20 percentage points higher in the Scandinavian countries a few years into the new millennium.
This suggests that the size of the public sector does not evolve in a subscribed pattern during the course of economic development, at least not within today's group of wealthy countries.
Nevertheless, the view that the public sector tends to grow in the long run relative to national income has become an accepted fact in public economics among many influential observers, including Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 326) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) , and in mainstream textbooks (e.g., Hindriks and Myles 2006, p. 79-80) . According to Lindert (1996, p. 5) -[t] he notion that income growth will raise taxes and government spending, including social spending, is the most durable black box in the whole rise-of-the-state literature.‖ This accords with 19 th century German social scientist Adolph Wagner's proposition (1893) that a positive relationship exists between level of economic development and scope of government.
Indeed, Wagner's proposition has increasingly gained the status of -law‖. In addition to casual empiricism, Wagner's Law has been tested empirically in both a time-series and crosssection framework; until the early 1990s, it received strong support with few exceptions.
Much fewer studies, however, analyze the major competing hypotheses seeking to explain any long-run tendency for increased government spending share: the displacement effect of Peacock and Wiseman (1961) and the ratchet effect of Bird (1971 Bird ( , 1972 ). An alternative version of the ratchet effect is developed by Buchanan and Wagner (1978) . It has the same implications as Bird's hypothesis, although the authors do not purport to explain the growth of government. As we will explain in Section 2, these hypotheses are in fact very similar, at least observationally, and can be treated as variants of the same hypothesis. They share one central idea: relative government spending ratchets upward in times of crises (wars, social upheavals, recessions), and then remains at the new, higher level after society and the economy normalize.
This paper carries out a critical reappraisal of Wagner's Law and the ratchet/displacement hypothesis by analyzing data spanning from the early 19 th century to the present day in the Sweden and United Kingdom. In contrast to previous studies, we evaluate the validity of 2 Wagner's Law from the beginning of industrialization until the present. Moreover, we compare two countries that have in many respects developed quite differently; Sweden can be regarded as the archetypal welfare state while the UK has become more of a -liberal market economy‖, following the example set by the US (Kitschelt et al. 1999) . Government expenditure as a share of GDP differs a great deal; in 2006 it was 54.3% in Sweden and 43.5% in the UK, while in 1980 it was 60% in Sweden and 43% in the UK.
Complemented by graphical analysis, we use cointegration analysis to investigate the longrun relationships between government expenditure and GDP. Cointegration analysis is standard in recent literature, but in contrast to most other studies, we focus explicitly on subperiods and parameter stability. Moreover, we test for the rival ratchet hypothesis by testing for asymmetric adjustment using a version of the approach developed by Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) , which allows for long-run growth in the government expenditure share.
Our study differs from virtually all others in that we analyze a very long time span. Furthermore, in contrast to some recent papers like , for example, we focus on within-country factors, rather than on those that mainly affect cross-country variations in the size of the public sector. Since the share of public expenditures in GDP varies between less than 10% to more than 60% in our data, variables such as the relative size of a country, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization and the type of constitution do not appear to be major causes of public sector growth.
Our main findings are similar for both countries: Wagner's Law does not hold in the long run.
During both the major part of the 19 th century and the years since the mid-1980s, the public sector as a share of GDP shrunk or changed little, even as economic growth increased. There are, however, two time periods during which data are consistent with Wagner's Law: approximately 1860 -1913 and 1920 -1965 (World War I makes the period of 1914 -1919 difficult to evaluate). Hence, Wagner's Law seems to have been irrelevant during both the initial industrialization phase, 1800-1860 in Sweden and 1830-1860 in the UK, and during recent periods, roughly since the 1970s. As a consequence, Wagner's Law is of little use for making predictions on the future growth of the public sector.
We also find that changes in the age structure of the population explain why Wagner's Law does not hold after the mid-1980s. The decline in expenditure shares coincides with lowered dependency ratios in both countries. This finding corresponds with , although his results indicate that it is the share of people aged 65 or older that creates a positive correlation between income and government size, as social expenditure on retirees is larger in rich countries, while we find that the share of school-age children also is important.
Despite that controlling for the dependency ratio reveals a stable relationship between government expenditure and GDP over the period , this fact alone cannot salvage
Wagner's Law. Instead, it shows that the main implication of the Law is undermined by its own dynamics, as dependency on age structure follows automatically when the public sector supplies services that are age-dependent, such as free education, child care, child allowances, and pensions. Moreover, age structure is to a large extent dependent on GDP per capita, as demonstrated by the theory of demographic transition (Caldwell 1976) . In fact, the current old-age boom in the developed world is a result of demographic transition.
Although there is no consistent evidence of a ratchet effect in either country, there is some evidence of asymmetric effects in both countries in the post-war period: recessions generate increases in government spending as a share of GDP, while expansions have little impact. The effects are short-run, since over time the asymmetry is removed by lagged responses to recessions and expansions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main competing theories of longrun public expenditure. Section 3 provides a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 tests for Wagner's Law, and Section 6 tests for asymmetric adjustment/ratchet effects. Section 7 contains a discussion of our results and Section 8 concludes.
4 2. Potential causes of the growth of government expenditure Wagner (1883 Wagner ( , 1893 finds that demographic change in combination with social policy-not income-explains the share of government in GDP, while Akitoby et al. (2006) and find support for Wagner's Law. Clearly, it has become necessary to determine why the results differ so much.
2 See also Biehl (1998) .
3 Much the same ideas have been expounded by more recent authors. See, for example, Kuznets (1967) and North and Wallis (1982) . 4 Wagner's proposition cut against the prevailing view at the time. It was widely believed that the need for government activity and public interference into the private sphere would diminish as a result of man's moral and economic progress (Tarschys 1975 PW assumed that taxation remains fairly stable in peacetime. As a consequence, the limited revenue capacity of the government prevents major increases in expenditure. In peacetime, desired government expenditure and the limits of taxation are likely to diverge. During periods of social upheaval such as war, this divergence is likely shrink, permanently displacing the burden of taxation upward. The end result is a higher expenditure plateau than before the onset of the upheaval. Formerly unacceptable revenue-raising methods are tolerated in times of crisis, and (it is claimed) the higher tax tolerance will persist even after the crisis subsides, thus enabling the government to implement expenditure programs that it previously desired but could not finance. Hence, the displacement effect asserts that the (horizontal) trend line will shift upward in discrete steps over time; these shifts are likely to be infrequent but fairly large.
Before long, other scholars proposed that the upward ratchet effect occurs more often than suggested by PW. Bird (1971 Bird ( , 1972 argues that economic downturns tend to affect the share of government spending, resulting in upward ratcheting. As it takes time to adjust government spending plans downwards, a declining GDP or slower GDP growth increases the spending ratio. Buchanan and Wagner (1978) claim that such upward ratcheting can be explained by the Keynesian prescription of a countercyclical fiscal policy. In theory, the budget should be 6 balanced over the business cycle; yet in practice, democratic politics give rise to secular deficits in the absence of a binding fiscal constitution that demands that surpluses in booms are as large as deficits in recessions. Politicians strive to be reelected, and the direct benefits of government spending are easily identified while the indirect costs of deficit financing are far more diffuse and imperfectly understood. Since Buchanan and Wagner's hypothesis is based on Keynesianism, it precludes any ratcheting before WWII.
Very few studies test directly for displacement or ratchet effects. Diamond (1977) , for example, fails to find support for the displacement effect. Goff (1998) During recent years, however, a number of studies have analyzed the relationship between government expenditure and income during business cycles. In developed economies, public spending has been found to be countercyclical (Alesina et al. 2008) or procyclical or unrelated to business cycles (Talvi and Végh 2005) . A few studies test for asymmetries in the line with the displacement and ratchet effect, finding that spending increases more during expansions than it decreases during contractions (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004 ). Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) , who analyze a panel of developed countries for a recent period, interpret their finding as support for the Buchanan-Wagner hypothesis.
However, they make clear that asymmetries only have a temporary effect on government expenditure shares.
Theoretical framework for Wagner's Law and the ratchet effect
Several functional forms have been used when testing for Wagner's Law (see, for example, Ram 1987 and Scott 2000) . But as suggested by Michas (1975) , Mann (1980) and , the following specification seems to capture the hypothesis:
where gs is the log of nominal public expenditure as a share of nominal GDP, ypc is the log of real per capita GDP, and  and  are coefficients. The coefficient of interest is  , which should be larger than zero according to Wagner's Law. 7 Eq. (1) is used by and is probably the most common formulation of Wagner's Law (e.g., Bohl 1996; Kwan and Sahni 1996; Chow et al. 2002) . Most other equations are reformulations of Eq. (1). There is one alternative specification, used by Ram (1987) , Goff (1998) and , which consists of the relationship between real government expenditure and real GDP. By excluding population, however, it overlooks that increases in real income per capita-not GDP-are expected to generate a proportionally larger increase in the demand for public services. Moreover, the use of real government expenditure is questionable; Wagner's Law is a hypothesis describing the evolution of the government spending share, including the effect emanating from differences in productivity growth of government and private sector production. In addition, changes in public sector wages are not captured when real expenditure is used, since they are treated as price changes (Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004) .
It is important to interpret Eq.
(1) as a long-run relationship between gs and ypc. This means that the equation is not expected to hold at all times, but rather on average over a given time period. Moreover, for Wagner's Law to hold, ypc has to determine gs. This does not preclude that government expenditure affects ypc, as Peacock and Scott (2000) make clear, although it seems unlikely that it would determine per capita GDP in the long run even if there could be a link via public investment. Fiscal policy, or using government expenditure to influence GDP growth, is not inconsistent with Wagner's Law either, although some claim it is (Biswal et al. 1999; Ziramba 2008 ). The reason is that the growth effects of fiscal policy are merely short to medium term.
Fiscal policy in combination with asymmetric responses can potentially generate a ratchet effect, which is a competing explanation for the growth of government. This hypothesis implies that the evolution of the expenditure share is merely the accumulated effect of shortrun asymmetric responses of government expenditures to temporary changes in output (Bird 1971 (Bird , 1972 Diamond 1977) . The hypothesis can be formulated as,
where ( ypc   ) is deviation from trend, or the business cycle;  is the trend in GDP per capita; P and N stand for positive and negative deviations from trend, or expansions and  and 2  should be negative because of countercyclical fiscal policy, although procyclical policy cannot be ruled out; it seems to be common in developing countries (Alesina et al. 2008 ).
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The displacement effect is related to the ratchet effect since it also implies that temporary increases in government expenditure have long-run effects, although there the focus lies on wars and other major social disturbances. 8 We use graphs in Section 4 to illustrate that this effect is unlikely to explain the growth of government expenditure. Goff (1998) , who tests the hypothesis on US data for 1889-1995, provides a more general interpretation of the displacement effect: any temporary shock to government expenditure could have a permanent or a highly persistent effect. With this interpretation, the empirical representation of the displacement effect is similar to Eq. (2) Goff finds that the displacement effect explains the evolution of government expenditure in the US. To account for the long-run growth in the government expenditure share, however, positive shocks have to be more common or larger than negative shocks. This is not captured by the models usually estimated; only the persistence of the shocks is tested. Furthermore, the tests are carried out in models with only one variable, so the observed persistence could be due to persistence in the excluded variables. Goff conducts some additional tests of 7 A body of literature exists that analyzes fiscal policy and how it affects government expenditures (Talvi and Végh 2000; Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004; Alesina et al. 2008) . However, it focuses on business cycles and is not concerned with the long-run growth of government expenditure. This is made very clear in the model developed by Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) . 8 Diamond (1977) , Tussing and Henning (1979) and Henrekson (1990) In an oft-cited paper, 
Cointegration analysis
To verify that the conclusions from the visual inspection of Figures 1-8 hold, we test for the presence of long-run relationships. All series are highly persistent, and we treat them as integrated of order one. Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit root tests, reported in Table 1A in Appendix A, indicate that this is a reasonable assumption. The existence of a long-run relationship can thus be tested with cointegration analysis. Yet, acceptance or rejection of Wagner's Law does not hinge on whether the series contain unit roots or not. If the series are trend stationary with structural breaks-which is the most likely alternative hypothesisWagner's Law could still hold, given that they have common breaks and that government expenditure grows faster than GDP when real GDP per capita grows, and vice versa.
Combined with cointegration analysis, the descriptive analysis in the previous subsection indicates that assuming that the series are stationary around structural breaks would not have affected our findings.
We report cointegration tests using the Engle-Granger procedure, which requires that at most one cointegrating vector exists and that the common factor restriction on the dynamics holds (Ericsson and MacKinnon 2002) . These requirements seem to be fulfilled: we only have two variables, so there cannot be more than one cointegrating vector; furthermore, autoregressive distributed lag models, which include dynamics, give similar long-run solutions as the EngleGranger (1987) Figure 10 shows that the pattern in the UK is similar.
Wagner Law and population structure
The literature on Wagner's Law rarely considers the age structure of the population, despite that it should affect expenditure. One exception to this is Shelton (2007) Table   2 ) and the dependency ratio in Sweden and the UK. There seems to be a tight relationship.
The definition of the dependency ratio and the year 1965 are ad hoc; using 0-14 instead, for example, works better for the 1950s, but worse for the 1990s. Hence, the reduction in the dependency ratio could potentially explain the decline in expenditure as a share of GDP during recent years.
Figures 11 and 12 about here Figure 11 ).
To check whether the dependency ratio is of consequence for other periods, we use the ratio of people 0-14 and 65+ to people aged 15-64, since this definition should be more relevant in the past. However, it is not significant for the period 1800-1913 in Sweden and 1841-1913 in the UK, as reported in Table 1 . Entering the dependency ratio in the models for makes the cointegrated in the UK; in Sweden we have already established cointegration during this period, so the only effect is a reduction in the value of the estimated root (see Table 2 ).
To conclude, we find long-run relationships for 1920-2006 in both Sweden and the UK, where real per capita GDP enters with a significant and positive coefficient (0.73 in Sweden and 0.56 in the UK). However, this is true only after controlling for the dependency ratio.
Even though we find cointegration for Sweden without the dependency ratio, the relationship between government expenditure and GDP can hardly be characterized as stable. It is therefore incorrect to interpret this finding as support for Wagner's Law-it still only holds in 1860-1913 and from 1920 to sometime about the 1970s. Instead, the finding shows that
Wagner's Law is undercut by its own dynamics, since dependency on the age structure follows automatically when the public sector supplies services that are age-dependent, such as free education, child care, child allowances, pensions, and so forth. Furthermore, the age structure is to a large extent dependent on GDP per capita in the long run, as demonstrated by the theory of demographic transition (Caldwell 1976 ). This interpretation of the role of demographics differs from , who argues that it is the age structure in combination with social security spending that generates the relation between gs and ypc.
However, this result probably arises from Shelton's relatively short sample period .
Testing for the displacement and ratchet effect
In this section we first use graphs to illustrate that the originally suggested displacement effect (Peacock and Wiseman 1961) has little empirical support. Then we test the more general 15 version of the displacement effect, namely the ratchet effect of Bird (1971 Bird ( , 1972 and Buchanan and Wagner (1978) .
We present three figures to illustrate the relevance of PW's displacement effect, plotting the government expenditure share of GDP and its past peak value. A minimum requirement for the effect to be valid, and thus substantively important, is the existence of occasional sharp increases in gs which are not followed by commensurate declines. economic crises. They did not, however, generate any discernible displacement effect; rather, the crises were followed by a reduction in the spending share. The ratchet effect can be interpreted as a generalized version of the displacement effect (Goff 1998) . For the ratchet effect to act as an alternative explanation to Wagner's Law, however, the evolution of the expenditure share should merely result from the accumulated effect of short-run asymmetries. The writings of Bird (1971 Bird ( , 1972 and Diamond (1977) do not clearly elucidate this fact. The finding of cointegration, albeit with the inclusion of the dependency ratio, therefore casts doubts on the ratchet effect as the major driver of the growth of government expenditure. Both Bird and Buchanan-Wagner were looking to explain the 16 evolution of government spending in the richest countries during the first quarter century following WWII. But can the pattern they (casually) observed be expected to apply over longer periods and highly varying conditions, or were the first decades of the postwar period unique in this respect? This is an interesting question that we now address below.
When testing the ratchet effect hypothesis, Goff (1998) focuses on the persistence of shocks to government expenditures. We prefer to explicitly model the impact of recessions and expansions on the growth of government expenditure, following Diamond (1977) and the literature on business cycles and fiscal policy (see Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004 The model differs from Diamond (1977) in two ways. First, we allow for dynamics by including lags in line with Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) , while Diamond estimates a static model. Second, we calculate  using the Hodrick-Prescott filter; the adjustment parameter is set to 6.25 as recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2001) . Diamond (1977) uses the growth rate of output as a measure of business cycles, while our approach is a common way to measure cyclicality (Lane 2003; Alesina et al. 2008 ).
The ratchet effect hypothesis implies that government expenditure is on average asymmetric over the business cycle; accordingly, the decline in the expenditure ratio, , gs is smaller during good times than the increase during bad times. Using Eq. (4), we can evaluate the hypothesis by calculating the steady-state solution 
where the terms in brackets are the coefficients of interest, summarized as P  and . N  For the ratchet effect to hold, it is necessary that .
PN
 
The hypothesis is easiest to understand if fiscal policy is assumed to be countercyclical, for then both coefficients are negative.
According to Eq. (4), business cycle fluctuations can generate immediate (within a year) adjustments in government expenditures; this is usually considered an adequate measure of fiscal policy (Alesina et al. 2008) . In this case, the hypothesis would be
.
However, it is possible that the adjustment process is slow or that the initial response is corrected the following year, so lags of   We divide the samples into two major time periods: 1803-1913 (1833-1913 for the UK) and 1923-2006; and four sub-periods 1803-59 (1832-1959 for the UK), 1860-1913, 1922-1937, and 1950-2006 . The division of the samples is partly based on the results of the cointegration tests in Table 1 and partly on Buchanan and Wagner (1978) , who argue that the ratchet effect is the result of Keynesian active fiscal policy after WWII. The models have dummies for large outliers due to the termination of the Russian War 1809 (Sweden), the Crimean War 1854-1856 (UK), and World War II. Some other observations can also be considered outliers, but we prefer to report specifications without them. Nonetheless, the results do not hinge on correcting for outliers, except for WWII. Tables 3 and 4 report the estimates of Eq. (4) for Sweden and the UK in different sub-periods.
We also report some estimates of restricted versions of Eq. (4) There is some evidence of short-run asymmetric adjustment, but the differences in the coefficients are in general not significant. There is no significant instantaneous response to expansions in Sweden, but the coefficients on contractions in the models for 1923-2006 and the sub-periods 1923-37 and 1950-2006 are negative and significant. The results for the UK are similar, but the asymmetric instantaneous response is stronger there than in Sweden.
There is also some evidence of asymmetry in the coefficients on the -error correction terms‖,
in all specifications for Sweden; adjustment back to long-run equilibrium seems to be faster during recessions than during expansions. In the UK the pattern is less systematic.
The specifications that exclude either contemporaneous or lagged Although the results have only been tentatively interpreted, they do not speak in favor of the ratchet effect, as this implies that fiscal policy should be countercyclical and asymmetric on average. Instead, the results support the hypothesis that other factors drive the growth of the public sector in the long run, including output per capita. This is in line with our findings in Section 3. There is indeed asymmetry in the short run during several periods, particularly in the UK, but this is offset by the adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.
Discussion
An obvious question to ask is why Wagner's Law holds in some periods only, notably the 40-50 years preceding WWI and the first 30-40 years after WWII. The late 19 th century is an era of increased political enfranchisement. Meltzer and Richard (1983) and Lindert (1994 Lindert ( , 2004a propose that government grows when the franchise is extended to include more voters below the median income (the decisive voter), when the growth of incomes provides revenues for increased redistribution and when the income distribution becomes more uneven. Government continues to grow because there is a difference between the political and the market processes. The market produces a distribution of income less equal than the distribution of votes, so those with the lowest incomes use the political process to implement redistributional programs in their own favor. This idea has been further refined in the -social affinity‖ theory (Kristov et al. 1992) , which predicts that government redistribution will be greater, the wider the pre-tax income gaps above median and the lower the gaps below median income. Lindert (1996) finds support for this theory in the 1960-81 period in the OECD.
The strong growth in the late 19 th century in both countries also made it possible for the governments to introduce a system of income tax collection around the year 1900, which, once introduced, is far more cost-efficient than a system based on customs and excise taxes (Levi 1988) . It therefore allows an expansion of government that is not possible under a more primitive tax collection regime. This can either be seen as a supply side explanation (Holcombe 2005) , or as a factor that eases the financing constraint for the government so that they can more easily cater to the demand of their citizens.
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The greatest expansion of the spending share takes place after WWII, lasting until 1980 in the UK and until the early 1990s in Sweden. Wagner's Law receives strong support during this period in both countries. Real income expands rapidly and government spending relative to GDP increases by roughly 20 and 40 percentage points, respectively. This development is abruptly reversed, and the decline in the spending ratio is particularly large in Sweden, where the spending share declines by almost 10 percentage points. This coincides with rapid real income growth.
Many observers-e.g., Cameron (1978) , Lindbeck (1976) , Rodrik (1998) Esping-Andersen (1990) identifies three broad welfare models: the Scandinavian, the Continental European and the Anglo-Saxon one.
Historical chance has often determined who has become responsible for the financing and provision of a certain service (the individual, her employer, the government or a nongovernment organization such as the church or the trade unions). Moreover, this can be changed by political decisions such as the Swedish pension reform in the early 1990s, which greatly reduced the government's share of pension payments by capping payments at a fairly low level and making outgoing pensions directly related to the current aggregate wage-sum in the economy (Palme 2005 Disincentive effects of a large government sector will set in sooner or later, and according to many observers such effects were apparent in both countries by the mid 1970s, but severe structural crises were required before relative government spending was lowered. 15 Since the early to mid 1990s there has been a great deal of deregulation of product markets, and globalization has strongly increased the competitive pressure both on firms and tax bases (Sinn 1998, Bergh and Karlsson 2010) . Moreover, as emphasized by Lindert (2004a) , hightax societies in general, and Sweden in particular, have been able to design the tax and transfer systems more efficiently than low-tax countries, thereby reducing the deadweight costs that is expected to arise from higher relative spending. 
Conclusion
We have tested existing theories purporting to explain the long-run evolution of government expenditure as a share of income. There are two main rival theories: Wagner's Law, which is a demand-side explanation, and ratchet effect hypotheses, which emphasize either larger crises (wars and other social upheavals) or shorter crises (recessions and economic downturns) in claiming that relative government spending ratchets upward during a crisis and 14 See also Thomsson (2009) There is no consistent evidence of a ratchet effect in either country. There is some evidence of an asymmetric effect in both countries in the post-war period, but this is reversed in subsequent periods. Hence, there is no clear evidence that the government exploits recessions and crises to permanently shift the government spending ratio upwards.
So, is Holcombe (2005) correct in his pessimistic and cynical conclusion that citizens are manipulated by politicians and government bureaucrats who would like to increase their power over our incomes and garner resources for themselves? The answer is no. It is clear that demand plays a significant role, but so does the agendas of politicians and bureaucrats. We know from other research that the opportunity to tax is restrained by the negative incentive effects that set in, particularly at high levels of government spending. Moreover, politicians are forced to consider what the electorate wants in order to legitimate the taxes levied and their own positions and entitlements. 17 Thus, there are no simple explanations for the long-run evolution of relative government spending, an argument made already by Wagner and Weber (1977) . Rather, the evolution is governed by a complex interplay between supply and demand factors, and deep-seated changes in underlying structural conditions over time
To conclude, Wagner's Law is not a stylized fact for how economies behave in the long run, although it seems to hold reasonably well over a period when the economy goes through a process of modernization. Neither does the ratchet hypothesis provide an adequate explanation for the long-term evolution of the government spending ratio. More complex explanations are called for, and our study suggests that these explanations are likely to vary strongly both over time and across countries.
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Appendix A: Complementary table Note: The equations in log-levels contain a constant and a trend and the equations in first differences contain a constant. ** *indicates rejection at 1% level and ** rejection at 5% level.
Appendix B: Data sources and definitions
Sweden (1920-2006)
Data on total government expenditure for the period 1920-49 are from Höök (1962) and Krantz (1987) . GDP data for 1920-49 are from Krantz and Nilsson (1975) . 
United Kingdom (1920-2006)
All data for the period 1920-60 are from Feinstein (1972) . Data for the years 1961-2006 come from OECD Economic Outlook, OECD Main Economic Indicators (both retrieved online from the SourceOECD database). Population statistics for the calculation of the age dependency ratios from UK National Statistics.
Data for 1800-1930
Except where otherwise indicated, the source is Mitchell (2007) . Text in italics refers to the specific headline where the statistics may be found in that book. 
